The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on. init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed on the next boot. /boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the command line --random-seed. If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time. The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as fallback entropy. The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe API for mapping single pages in the early kernel. sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the 10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB, this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
261 lines
7.2 KiB
C
261 lines
7.2 KiB
C
/* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.48 2014/07/19 00:08:41 deraadt Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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/* $OpenBSD: chacha_private.h,v 1.2 2013/10/04 07:02:27 djm Exp $ */
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/* Based on:
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* chacha-merged.c version 20080118
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* D. J. Bernstein
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* Public domain.
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*/
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/* Adapted for Sortix libc by Jonas 'Sortie' Termansen in 2014, 2015. */
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <endian.h>
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#include <pthread.h>
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#ifdef __is_sortix_libk
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#include <libk.h>
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#endif
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struct chacha
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{
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uint32_t input[16];
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};
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static inline uint32_t chacha_read_little_uint32(const unsigned char* buf)
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{
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return (uint32_t) buf[0] << 0 |
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(uint32_t) buf[1] << 8 |
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(uint32_t) buf[2] << 16 |
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(uint32_t) buf[3] << 24;
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}
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static void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha* ctx, const unsigned char* key)
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{
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const unsigned char* sigma = (const unsigned char*) "expand 32-byte k";
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ctx->input[0] = chacha_read_little_uint32(sigma + 0 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[1] = chacha_read_little_uint32(sigma + 1 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[2] = chacha_read_little_uint32(sigma + 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[3] = chacha_read_little_uint32(sigma + 3 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[4] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 0 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[5] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 1 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[6] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[7] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 3 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[8] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 4 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[9] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 5 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[10] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 6 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[11] = chacha_read_little_uint32(key + 7 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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}
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static void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha* ctx, const unsigned char* iv)
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{
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ctx->input[12] = 0;
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ctx->input[13] = 0;
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ctx->input[14] = chacha_read_little_uint32(iv + 0 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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ctx->input[15] = chacha_read_little_uint32(iv + 1 * sizeof(uint32_t));
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}
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static inline uint32_t chacha_rotate(uint32_t v, uint32_t n)
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{
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return (v << n) | (v >> (32 - n));
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}
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static inline
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void chacha_quarter_round(uint32_t* a, uint32_t* b, uint32_t* c, uint32_t* d)
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{
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*a = *a + *b;
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*d = chacha_rotate(*d ^ *a, 16);
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*c = *c + *d;
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*b = chacha_rotate(*b ^ *c, 12);
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*a = *a + *b;
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*d = chacha_rotate(*d ^ *a, 8);
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*c = *c + *d;
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*b = chacha_rotate(*b ^ *c, 7);
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}
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static
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void chacha_keystream(struct chacha* ctx,
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unsigned char* keystream,
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size_t size)
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{
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uint32_t work[16];
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for ( size_t offset = 0; offset < size; )
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{
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size_t left = size - offset;
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for ( size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
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work[i] = ctx->input[i];
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/* NOTE: This is 20 in the OpenBSD version, but 8 in Bernstein's. */
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/* TODO: Why decrement by 2 instead of 1? */
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for ( int i = 20; 0 < i; i -= 2 )
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{
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[0], &work[4], &work[8], &work[12]);
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[1], &work[5], &work[9], &work[13]);
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[2], &work[6], &work[10], &work[14]);
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[3], &work[7], &work[11], &work[15]);
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[0], &work[5], &work[10], &work[15]);
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[1], &work[6], &work[11], &work[12]);
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[2], &work[7], &work[8], &work[13]);
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chacha_quarter_round(&work[3], &work[4], &work[9], &work[14]);
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}
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for ( size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
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work[i] += ctx->input[i];
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ctx->input[12] += 1;
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if ( ctx->input[12] == 0 )
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{
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ctx->input[13] += 1;
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/* Stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility. */
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}
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for ( size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++ )
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work[i] = htole32(work[i]);
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size_t amount = left < 64 ? left : 64;
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memcpy(keystream + offset, work, amount);
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offset += amount;
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}
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explicit_bzero(work, sizeof(work));
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}
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#define KEYSZ 32
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#define IVSZ 8
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#ifndef __is_sortix_libk
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static pthread_mutex_t arc4random_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
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#endif
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/* TODO: Use address space randomization of libc global variables such that
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these variables end up in unpredictable places. */
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static bool rs_initialized = false;
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#ifndef __is_sortix_libk
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static pid_t rs_pid = 0;
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#endif
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static size_t rs_have = 0;
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static size_t rs_count = 0;
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static struct chacha rs_chacha;
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static unsigned char rs_buf[16 * 64];
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void arc4random_buf(void* buffer_ptr, size_t size)
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{
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unsigned char entropy[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
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unsigned char* buffer = (unsigned char*) buffer_ptr;
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#ifdef __is_sortix_libk
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libk_random_lock();
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if ( libk_hasentropy(sizeof(entropy)) )
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{
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rs_count = 0;
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rs_have = 0;
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memset(rs_buf, 0, sizeof(rs_buf));
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}
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#else
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pthread_mutex_lock(&arc4random_mutex);
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/* TODO: Employ zero-memory-on-fork semantics instead. */
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/* pid_t are never reused on Sortix at the moment. */
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if ( getpid() != rs_pid )
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{
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rs_count = 0;
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rs_have = 0;
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memset(rs_buf, 0, sizeof(rs_buf));
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/* TODO: Should rs_chacha be zeroed as well? */
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rs_pid = getpid();
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}
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#endif
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while ( 0 < size )
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{
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size_t available = rs_have;
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if ( size < available )
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available = size;
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if ( rs_count < available )
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available = rs_count;
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if ( 0 < available )
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{
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unsigned char* randomness = rs_buf + sizeof(rs_buf) - rs_have;
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memcpy(buffer, randomness, available);
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memset(randomness, 0, available);
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rs_count -= available;
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rs_have -= available;
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buffer += available;
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size -= available;
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}
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if ( rs_count == 0 )
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{
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#ifdef __is_sortix_libk
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libk_getentropy(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
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#else
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getentropy(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
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#endif
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if ( rs_initialized )
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{
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unsigned char old_entropy[sizeof(entropy)];
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chacha_keystream(&rs_chacha, old_entropy, sizeof(old_entropy));
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for ( size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(entropy); i++ )
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entropy[i] ^= old_entropy[i];
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explicit_bzero(old_entropy, sizeof(old_entropy));
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}
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chacha_keysetup(&rs_chacha, entropy);
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chacha_ivsetup(&rs_chacha, entropy + KEYSZ);
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rs_initialized = true;
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explicit_bzero(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
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rs_have = 0;
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memset(rs_buf, 0, sizeof(rs_buf));
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rs_count = 1600000;
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}
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if ( rs_have == 0 )
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{
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chacha_keystream(&rs_chacha, rs_buf, sizeof(rs_buf));
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chacha_keysetup(&rs_chacha, rs_buf);
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chacha_ivsetup(&rs_chacha, rs_buf + KEYSZ);
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rs_have = sizeof(rs_buf) - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
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}
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}
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#ifdef __is_sortix_libk
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libk_random_unlock();
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#else
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pthread_mutex_unlock(&arc4random_mutex);
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#endif
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}
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