This change adds all the kernel parts of a network stack. The network stack
is partial but implements many of the important parts.
Add if(4) network interface abstraction. Network interfaces are registered
in a global list that can be iterated and each assigned an unique integer
identifier.
Add reference counted packets with a cache that recycles recent packets.
Add support for lo(4) loopback and ether(4) ethernet network interfaces.
The /dev/lo0 loopback device is created automatically on boot.
Add arp(4) address resolution protocol driver for translation of inet(4)
network layer addresses into ether(4) link layer addresses. arp(4) entries
are cached and evicted from the cache when needed or when the entry has not
been used for a while. The cache is limited to 256 entries for now.
Add ip(4) internet protocol version 4 support. IP fragmentation and options
are not implemented yet.
Add tcp(4) transmission control protocol sockets for a reliable transport
layer protocol that provides a reliable byte stream connection between two
hosts. The implementation is incomplete and does not yet implement out of
band data, options, and high performance extensions.
Add udp(4) user datagram protocol sockets for a connectionless transport
layer that provides best-effort delivery of datagrams.
Add ping(4) sockets for a best-effort delivery of echo datagrams.
Change type of sa_family_t from unsigned short to uint16_t.
Add --disable-network-drivers to the kernel(7) options and expose it with a
bootloader menu. tix-iso-bootconfig can set this option by default.
Import CRC32 code from libz for the Ethernet checksum.
This is a compatible ABI change that adds features to socket(2) (AF_INET,
IPPROTO_TCP, IPPROTO_UDP, IPPROTO_PING), the ioctls for if(4), socket
options, and the lo0 loopback interface.
This commit is based on work by Meisaka Yukara contributed as the commit
bbf7f1e8a5238a2bd1fe8eb1d2cc5c9c2421e2c4. Almost no lines of this work
remains in this final commit as it has been rewritten or refactored away
over the years, see the individual file headers for which files contain
remnants of this work.
Co-authored-by: Meisaka Yukara <Meisaka.Yukara@gmail.com>
Previously Sortix would initialize SSE unconditionally as part of the
boot process. Since earlier i686 CPUs like Pentium 2 did not include
SSE, Sortix would not run on them. With this SSE is only enabled for
CPUs that include it, which should theoretically allow Sortix to boot on
all i686 CPUs. Additionally, this removes -msse -msse2 compiler flags
from trianglix/Makefile.
roff(7) dictates that "Each sentence should terminate at the end of an
input line." Instead of doing this, Sortix manpages (incorrectly) used
double-spaces to separate sentences.
Additionally, fix a few small typos.
The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in
which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel
warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was
given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no
prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random
seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on.
init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same
entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on
system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if
writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and
keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then
responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed
on the next boot.
/boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must
have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file
is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the
command line --random-seed.
If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback
where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time.
The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real
kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved
to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as
fallback entropy.
The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible
and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe
API for mapping single pages in the early kernel.
sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary
compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB
port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the
10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will
need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB,
this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
Jonas 'Sortie' Termansen
Juhani Krekelä
Nicholas De Nova